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The initial phase of the Trump administration's Middle East plan has provoked a collective feeling of reassurance among EU officials. Following 24 months of violence, the truce, captive releases, partial Israeli military withdrawal, and humanitarian access provide optimism – yet regrettably, furnish a pretext for Europe to continue inaction.

The EU's Troubling Position on the Gaza War

Regarding the war in Gaza, unlike the Russian aggression in Ukraine, European governments have revealed their worst colours. Deep divisions exist, leading to political gridlock. But worse than inaction is the accusation of collusion in Israel's war crimes. EU bodies have been unwilling to exert pressure on the perpetrators while continuing commercial, political, and military cooperation.

Israel's violations have sparked widespread anger among the European public, yet European leaders have become disconnected with their own people, especially youth. Just five years ago, the EU championed the environmental movement, addressing youth demands. Those same youth are now appalled by their government's passivity over Gaza.

Delayed Recognition and Weak Measures

It took two years of a conflict that many consider a genocide for multiple EU countries including France, Britain, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden to recognise the State of Palestine, after other European nations' example from last year.

Just last month did the EU executive propose the initial cautious punitive measures toward Israel, including sanctioning radical officials and violent settlers, plus suspending European trade benefits. Nevertheless, neither step have been implemented. The first requires complete consensus among all member states – unlikely given fierce resistance from countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic. The other could pass with a supermajority, but Germany and Italy's opposition have rendered it ineffective.

Contrasting Approaches and Damaged Credibility

In June, the EU found that Israel had violated its human rights obligations under the bilateral trade deal. However, recently, the EU's foreign policy chief halted efforts to suspend the agreement's trade privileges. The contrast with the EU's multiple rounds of Russian sanctions could not be more pronounced. On Ukraine, Europe has stood tall for democracy and global norms; on Gaza, it has shattered its credibility in the eyes of the world.

The US Initiative as an Escape Route

Now, the American proposal has offered Europe with an way out. It has enabled EU nations to support Washington's demands, like their stance on the Ukrainian conflict, defense, and commerce. It has permitted them to trumpet a new dawn of stability in the region, redirecting focus from punitive measures toward backing for the American initiative.

The EU has retreated into its familiar position of playing second fiddle to the United States. While Middle Eastern nations are expected to bear responsibility for an international stabilisation force in Gaza, European governments are lining up to participate with humanitarian assistance, rebuilding, administrative help, and frontier supervision. Discussion of pressure on Israel has largely vanished.

Implementation Challenges and Geopolitical Constraints

All this is understandable. Trump's plan is the sole existing proposal and certainly the single approach with any chance, even if limited, of success. This is not due to the intrinsic value of the proposal, which is problematic at best. It is rather because the United States is the only player with sufficient influence over Israel to alter behavior. Supporting US diplomacy is therefore both practical for European leaders, it makes sense too.

However, implementing the plan beyond initial steps is more challenging than anticipated. Numerous obstacles and catch-22s exist. Israel is unlikely to fully pull out from Gaza unless Hamas lays down weapons. But Hamas will not disarm completely unless Israel withdraws.

Future Prospects and Required Action

This initiative aims to transition toward Palestinian self-government, first involving local experts and then a "restructured" Palestinian Authority. But administrative reform means vastly distinct things to the Americans, Europeans, Arab countries, and the Palestinians themselves. Israel opposes this entity altogether and, with it, the concept of a Palestinian state.

Israel's leadership has been explicitly clear in repeating its consistent objective – the destruction of Hamas – and has carefully evaded discussing an end to the war. It has not completely adhered to the truce: since it began, numerous of non-combatants have been killed by Israeli forces, while others have been injured by militant groups.

Without the international community, and particularly the US and Europe, exert greater pressure on Israel, the likelihood exists that widespread conflict will resume, and Gaza – as well as the West Bank – will continue being occupied. In short, the remaining points of the initiative will not see the light of day.

Conclusion

This is why Europeans are wrong to consider backing the US initiative and pressure on Israel as separate or contradictory. It is expedient but factually wrong to view the first as part of the paradigm of peace and the latter to one of ongoing conflict. This is not the moment for the EU and its constituent countries to feel let off the hook, or to abandon the initial cautious steps toward punitive measures and conditionality.

Leverage exerted on Israel is the only way to surmount political hurdles, and if this is achieved, Europe can finally make a modest – but positive, at least – contribution to peace in the region.